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The Supreme Court’s Rationale in
Capital Cases: A One Way Street?
Kimberly Bliss*
I. Introduction
On June 25, 2008, the Supreme Court held in the case of Kennedy v.
Louisiana that the Eighth Amendment1 prohibited the state of Louisiana
from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime
did not result and was not intended to result in the child‘s death.2 This
decision, which invalidated a number of state laws that allowed the death
penalty in some instances of child rape,3 was decided on the basis of the
Court‘s interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment in light of ―the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.‖4 The Supreme Court‘s use of this standard in capital cases in

* J.D. Candidate, Pace Law School, 2011; B.A., Purchase College, 2007.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits
the Federal Government from imposing excessive bail, excessive fines and cruel and
unusual punishments. The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has been
extended to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
3. The result of the decision in Kennedy was to invalidate state laws allowing for
the imposition of the death penalty in Louisiana, Texas, Florida, Montana, Oklahoma and
South Carolina. Id. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (D)(2) (Supp. 1996), invalidated
by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3)
(Vernon Supp. 2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5503(3)(c)(i) (2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 7115(K) (Supp. 2007), invalidated by Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
2641 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (C)(1) (Supp. 2007), invalidated by Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(2) (2007), invalidated by
Buford v. Florida, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981). It is worthwhile to note that the Florida
Supreme Court, in invalidating the portion of the Florida statute that authorized the death
penalty for child rape, relied on the Court‘s reasoning in Coker and expanded from rape
of an adult woman to child rape. Buford, 403 So. 2d at 950 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977)).
4. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
The Court held in Trop that the provision of Section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of
1940, authorizing expatriation of a person who had been convicted by military court
martial of wartime desertion, violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. 356 U.S. at 114.
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light of the decision in Kennedy has engendered criticism from the
media, politicians, and other commentators on the ground that the
Supreme Court is usurping the role of the legislature in defining the
mores of society.5 This criticism by the media and others is supported by
Justice Alito‘s dissent, which in effect moves beyond the decision in
Kennedy to question whether the Court‘s position in past cases has and
will ultimately influence its current and future decisions.6
This Note contends that the process employed by the Supreme
Court in deciding Eighth Amendment capital cases is decidedly biased.
The result of the procedural bias in the standard utilized by the Court is
an almost certain outcome of increased prohibition on capital
punishment. Part I will explore the standard that the Supreme Court has
utilized in deciding Eighth Amendment capital punishment cases. Part II
will examine the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Kennedy v.
Louisiana. This section will also look at the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Coker v. Georgia7 and explore the possible influence that the decision in
Coker had on the Court‘s decision in Kennedy. Part III will look at the
impact that the Kennedy decision has had on current legislative
enactments and could have on future legislative freedom in the arena of
death penalty legislation. This Note will conclude by showing that in
continuing to utilize the current analytical framework, the Supreme
Court, itself, is becoming so intertwined in its own process that the result
is a predetermined unidirectional evolution of the concept of what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
II. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence in Capital Cases
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the imposition
of cruel and unusual punishment.8 This prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, which has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
5. Senator John McCain called the decision ―an assault on law enforcement‘s
efforts to punish these heinous felons for the most despicable crime.‖ Linda Greenhouse,
Supreme Court Rejects Death Penalty for Child Rape, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/washington/26scotuscnd.html.
President Obama, then-Senator Obama, stated that he thought ―that the rape of a small
child, 6 or 8 years old, is a heinous crime, and if a state makes a decision under narrow,
limited, well-defined circumstances, that the death penalty is at least potentially
applicable, that does not violate our Constitution.‖ Id.
6. See generally Kennedy, 128 U.S. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito was
joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas.
7. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Amendment‘s due process clause,9 has not been interpreted to be a
stagnant, frozen concept, but one that is both flexible and dynamic. It is
an ever-changing concept based on society‘s ―evolving standards of
[common] decency.‖10 In applying this evolving standard of decency to
capital cases, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the death
penalty is not per se unconstitutional as a cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment, but that there is a limit on the instances
and circumstances where the death penalty can be properly imposed.11
In effect, capital punishment, as the most severe penalty, should be
―limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most
serious crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the most
deserving of execution.‖12
In attempting to quantify society‘s ―evolving standards of common
decency,‖ the Supreme Court has utilized a two-step approach in
analyzing death penalty regulations. First, the Court looks to objective
evidence to determine whether there exists a national consensus in
regards to the regulation in question.13 After the determination of the
existence or non-existence of a national consensus, the Court then
proceeds to utilize its own independent judgment and determines
whether the death penalty is a proportionate punishment to the crime that
has been committed.14
In determining the existence or non-existence of national consensus,
the Court looks towards ―objective indicia that reflect the public attitude

9. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (applying the Eighth
Amendment to the state of California via the Fourteenth Amendment and holding that
California law authorizing a ninety day jail sentence for being addicted to the use of
narcotics was in violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments).
10. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Accord Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 382 (1972) (stating that the standard to be utilized ―remains the same, but its
applicability must change as the basic mores of society change‖); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (asserting that the Eighth Amendment prohibition ―is
not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice‖).
11. Kennedy, 128 U.S. at 2650. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(upholding the Georgia statute that provided for a bifurcated process in death penalty
cases); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (resulting in state death penalty statutes
being held unconstitutional because the statutes in question allowed judges and juries
broad discretion in imposing the death penalty).
12. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
13. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593
(1977).
14. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312; Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.

3

1318

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

toward a given sanction.‖15 The Court has regarded such variables as
state practice—including state sentencing decisions by juries and the
number of executions that have been carried out—current legislative
enactments, and both the direction and consistency of change in
legislative enactments.16 In the landmark case of Atkins v. Virginia,17
after observing that thirty states had legislation prohibiting the death
penalty for those deemed mentally retarded and that only five offenders
had been executed with a known IQ under seventy, it was determined
that there was a national consensus supporting the conclusion that the
imposition of the death penalty on those who were classified as mentally
retarded was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.18 Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons,19 the Supreme Court
observed that in 1989, twenty-two out of the thirty-seven states imposing
the death penalty permitted execution for sixteen-year-old offenders and
twenty-five of those thirty-seven states allowed the death penalty for
seventeen-year-olds.20 By 2005, however, eighteen of the states allowing
the death penalty prohibited, by statute or case law, the execution of
juveniles.21 While the Supreme Court observed that twenty states still
had statutes allowing for the execution of juveniles, it was noted that
there was a consistent direction of change in legislative enactments
concerning the minimum age for a death penalty sentence.22 The Court
found it notable that since 1989, ―no State that previously prohibited
capital punishment for juveniles‖ had reinstated it.23 This trend showed
consistency in the direction of change, leading the Court to conclude that
a national consensus existed. The Court, thereafter, held that the
imposition of the death penalty on individuals under the age of eighteen
was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.24

15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
16. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-81 (considering the legislative response of the
thirty-five states that reenacted statutes providing for the death penalty after the Court‘s
previous decision in Furman v. Georgia and the number of individuals sentenced to death
since Furman); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 790-800; Roper, 543
U.S. at 564-68.
17. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
18. Id. at 314-17.
19. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
20. Roper, 543 U.S. at 562; Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 362 (1989).
21. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
22. Id. at 565.
23. Id. at 566.
24. Id. at 578.
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After determining the existence of a national consensus, the
Supreme Court then utilizes its own independent judgment to decide
―[w]hether the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime committed .
. . .‖25 This approach follows the view that ―the Constitution
contemplates that in the end [the Supreme Court‘s] own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.‖26 In reaching a conclusion as to the
proportionality of the death penalty under the circumstances, the Court
considers whether the legislation in question serves the important social
purposes of deterrence and retribution.27 For without contribution to one
of those social purposes, the death penalty ―is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.‖28
In utilizing its own independent judgment to determine whether the
death penalty under given circumstances serves such important social
purposes as to justify its use, the Court considers the type of criminal
conduct that is sought to be punished with death. It has been said that
―capital punishment is an expression of society‘s moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct.‖29
―[T]he decision that capital
punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an
expression of the community‘s belief that certain crimes are themselves
so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may
be the penalty of death.‖30 The death penalty, as a mechanism of
retribution, is said to serve an important purpose in a society that is built
on law and order rather than self-help for perceived wrongs.
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man,
and channeling that instinct in the administration of
criminal justice serves an important purpose in
promoting the stability of a society governed by law.
When people begin to believe that organized society is
unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders
the punishment they ‗deserve,‘ then there are sown the
seeds of anarchy – of self-help, vigilante justice, and

25. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008).
26. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
27. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
798 (1982).
28. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
29. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183.
30. Id. at 184.
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lynch law.31
In Atkins and Roper, however, the Court looked beyond the type of
offense being committed; it looked to the characteristics and the moral
culpability of the criminal offender facing the death penalty.32 Even
when the type of crime committed is classified as wanton, vile, and
particularly offensive, unless the perpetrator has demonstrated a certain
level of understanding, maturity and culpability, the criminal conduct
may not be classified as morally reprehensible enough as to warrant the
imposition of the death penalty.33 ―Retribution is not proportional if the
law‘s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree . . . .‖34 As a
result, certain classes of criminal offenders, such as individuals under the
age of eighteen and those classified as mentally retarded, have been
found to lack the requisite culpability, and as such, the death penalty for
those classes of individuals has been deemed to violate the Eighth
Amendment.35
In addition to the type of offense and the character of the offender
who is sought to be punished with death, the Court has looked to
evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent against future
criminal behavior.36 The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that
deterrence is a complex factual issue and that the ―assessment of the
efficacy of various criminal penalty schemes‖ is an appropriate
legislative matter.37 Despite this acknowledgment, the value of the death
penalty as a deterrent is an important factor in the Court‘s consideration
of death penalty statutes.38 In considering this factor, the type of crime
and the character of the criminal offender are once again evaluated. The
Court looks to see whether there would be a decrease in the occurrence
of the criminal behavior for which the imposition of death penalty is
being sought as a sanction. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court noted an
31. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972).
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
33. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557, 568-72.
34. Id. at 571.
35. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
36. The use of the death penalty as a deterrent to future criminal behavior is a
separate consideration than the use of the death penalty to incapacitate the actual criminal
offender, and therefore, as a result, prevent the crimes that the executed criminal may
have potentially committed in the future.
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; accord Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976).
38. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
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almost ten percent increase in the number of murders, from 18,520 to
20,400, in the three years after the decision in Furman v. Georgia was
announced.39 While the Court did not find this increase conclusive of the
death penalty‘s effect as a deterrent, it was concluded that while they
―may nevertheless safely assume that there are murderers, such as those
who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent
effect,‖ there are those ―carefully contemplated murders, such as murder
for hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold
calculus that precedes the decision to act.‖40 For these types of murders
the Court concluded that the death penalty could serve as a deterrent.
This assessment of the death penalty‘s use as a deterrent and means
of retribution are the guiding force behind the utilization of Supreme
Court‘s own independent judgment in Eighth Amendment capital cases.
Combined with evidence of the existence or non-existence of a national
consensus, the Supreme Court has decided throughout the past thirty
some years that the death penalty is unconstitutional when imposed on
individuals under the age of eighteen, those classified as mentally
retarded, and those offenders who were convicted of committing
vicarious felony murder.41
III. Coker v. Georgia and Kennedy v. Louisiana
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia held that the
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, without
the victim‘s resulting death, was unconstitutional.42 The result of this
decision was to overturn a Georgia statute that allowed the sentence of
death for rape of an adult woman.43 The Court in Coker looked to the

39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186. The decision in Furman had the effect of invalidating
almost all death penalty statutes and as such caused a moratorium of the death penalty.
40. Id. at 185-86.
41. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982).
42. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Petitioner Coker, while serving various
sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, escaped from prison in
August of 1974. Id. at 587. After the escape from prison, Coker entered the Carver
house, obtained a knife from the kitchen, tied up Mr. Carver, took all of Mr. Carver‘s
money and proceeded to rape Mrs. Carver. Id. After raping Mrs. Carver, Coker drove
away in the Carver family car taking Mrs. Carver with him. Id. Coker was apprehended
not long after by the police. Id. He was subsequently charged with escape, armed
robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping, and rape. Id. The defendant was convicted on
these charges and was sentenced to death on the rape charge after a jury found that there
had been aggravating circumstances. Id.
43. Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972), invalidated by Coker v. Georgia, 433
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history of the death penalty as a punishment for the crime of rape. In
1925, eighteen states as well as the District of Columbia and the Federal
Government had statutes that allowed the death penalty in cases of rape
of either an adult or a child.44 In 1972, however, the Supreme Court
decided the case of Furman v. Georgia,45 which had the result of
invalidating most of the state statutes that authorized the death penalty
for the crime of rape. After the decision in Furman, only six states
reenacted their statutes authorizing the death penalty for rape.46 Yet by
1977, only Georgia had a valid statute authorizing the death penalty for
adult rape.47 The plurality in Coker also noted that in the majority of
cases, juries had not imposed the death penalty for rape when they had
the opportunity. The Court concluded on the basis of this history and
―objective evidence of the country‘s present judgment concerning the
acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an adult woman‖ that the
death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman where the
woman was not killed was unconstitutional as a violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.48
Fast forward over thirty years to 2008 and the Supreme Court was
faced with a very similar issue: whether the imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of child rape where the victim was not killed
violated the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. On March 2, 1998, Patrick Kennedy called 911 to report
that his eight-year-old stepdaughter had been raped.49 It was originally
reported to the local police that the rape was committed by two
neighborhood boys who had allegedly dragged the victim from the
garage of her home.50 Due to inconsistencies in the victim‘s original
version of the rape and other conflicting evidence in the alleged crime
scene, police arrested Patrick Kennedy eight days after the rape.51
U.S. 584 (1977).
44. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593.
45. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
46. Coker, 433 U.S. at 594.
47. Id. at 595-96.
48. Id. at 593.
49. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008).
50. Id.
51. It was originally alleged that the rape had occurred in the side yard of the
Kennedy house. Id. at 2647. Upon inspection of the side yard, police found that the area
was largely undisturbed but for a small patch of blood. Id. Additionally, police found
blood on the underside of the victim‘s mattress. Id. Police also discovered that Kennedy
had made two phone calls: one to a colleague asking how to get blood out of a white
carpet and the second to a carpet cleaning company requesting assistance in removing
blood stains from a carpet. Id. These phone calls were placed over an hour before the
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Patrick Kennedy was charged under Louisiana law with the aggravated
rape of his then eight-year-old stepdaughter.52 After a jury found Patrick
Kennedy guilty of aggravated rape, he was sentenced to death under a
state statute that authorized capital punishment for the rape of a child
who was under twelve years of age.53 The Louisiana Supreme Court
upheld Patrick Kennedy‘s conviction and sentence, rejecting the
contention that Coker barred the use of the death penalty as a punishment
for rape.54 The Louisiana Supreme Court ―distinguished the rape of a
child from the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Coker. For
while Coker clearly bars the use of the death penalty as punishment for
the rape of an adult woman, it left open the question of which, if any,
non-homicide crimes can be constitutionally punished by death.‖55
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. ―Based both on consensus
and [their] own independent judgment, [the Court‘s] holding [was] that
[the] death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who
did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.‖56 In reaching this
conclusion, the Supreme Court looked once again to objective evidence
to determine whether a national consensus existed in regards to the death
penalty as punishment for the crime of child rape, where the child was
neither killed nor was intended to be killed. The Court looked to the
history of the death penalty for the crime of rape as its starting point in
determining whether there was a national consensus. In 1925, eighteen
states had statutes that authorized the death penalty for the rape of a
child.57 Between the years of 1930 and 1964, four hundred and fifty-five
individuals were executed for rape.58 It was in 1964 that the last known

phone call to 911. Id.
52. Id.
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (D)(2) (Supp. 1996), invalidated by Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). The statute provides that ―[a]ggravated rape is a rape
committed . . . where the anal or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without
lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the
following circumstances . . . [such as] [w]hen the victim is under the age of twelve years.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (A)(4) (Supp. 1996). The statute further provides that ―if
the victim was under the age of twelve years . . . [a]nd if the district attorney seeks a
capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment . . . in
accordance with the determination of the jury. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (D)(1).
54. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2648.
55. Louisiana v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757, 781 (La. 2007).
56. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650-51.
57. Id. at 2651.
58. Id.
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individual was executed for the rape of a child.59
After the decision in Furman, which had the effect of invalidating
most state statutes that authorized the death penalty for the crime of rape,
six states revised and reinstated their capital rape statutes.60 By the end
of 1977, all six of these statutes were invalidated.61 In 1995, the state of
Louisiana reenacted the death penalty for the rape of a child under the
age of twelve.62 Since 1995, five other states have enacted legislation
allowing for the death penalty in some instances of child rape: Georgia,
Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.63 The statutes in
Montana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas make child rape a
capital offense when the offender has a previous rape conviction.64
Georgia‘s statute had the effect of making child rape a capital crime
when aggravating circumstances existed.65 Under Georgia‘s statute,
aggravating circumstances included factors, such as the prior record of
conviction for a capital offense, the crime being committed while the
offender was engaged in another capital crime or in the commission of
burglary or arson in the first degree, the crime being committed for the
purpose of receiving money, or the crime was outrageously vile or
inhuman.66
The Court in reaching a conclusion about the existence of a national
consensus compared this data with that in Atkins, Roper, and Enmund.
In Atkins, the Court noted that thirty states prohibited the death penalty
for mentally retarded individuals.67 In Roper, there was a similar amount
of states prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on those under
the age of eighteen.68 In Enmund, only eight jurisdictions allowed the
imposition of the death penalty for participation in a robbery during the
course of which an accomplice committed murder.69 In comparison, the
Court found that the six states allowing for the imposition of the death
59. Id. Ronald Wolfe was executed in 1964.
60. Id. Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana reenacted their statutes for all rape
offenses. Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee reenacted their statutes only in respect to
child rape. Id.
61. Id. The decision in Coker invalidated the last of the six statutes that had been
reenacted.
62. Id. The statute later was modified to allow for the death penalty for the rape of
a child less than thirteen years of age, instead of twelve.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (Supp. 2007).
66. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(1-11) (Supp. 2007).
67. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2653.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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penalty in cases of child rape was not evidence of a national consensus.
The evidence of a national consensus with respect to the
death penalty for child rapists, as with respect to
juveniles, mentally retarded offenders, and vicarious
felony murderers, shows divided opinion but, on
balance, an opinion against it. Thirty-seven jurisdictions
– 36 States plus the Federal Government – have the
death penalty. As mentioned above, only six of those
jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for rape of a
child. Though our review of national consensus is not
confined to tallying numbers of States with applicable
death penalty legislation, it is of significance that, in 45
jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child
rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in
Atkins and Roper and the 42 States in Enmund that
prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances
those cases considered.70
It was acknowledged that an otherwise consistent direction of change in
legislative enactments might otherwise ―counterbalance an otherwise
weak demonstration of consensus,‖ but the Court ultimately determined
that there had been no showing that a consistent change had occurred.71
Beyond the consideration of legislative enactments, state practice in
regards to executions and jury sentencing decision also factored into the
determination of the non-existence of a national consensus. It was found
highly significant that while nine states had permitted the death penalty
for rape for some period of time between 1972 and 2008, no state had
executed any individual for the rape of either an adult or a child since
1964. The Court noted that at the time of its decision there were only
two individuals on death row in the United States for non-homicide
crimes.72 Based on this objective evidence, the Supreme Court
concluded that there was no national consensus in support of capital
punishment for the crime of child rape. To the contrary, it was the
conclusion of the Supreme Court that there was a national consensus
against the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of a child.
70. Id. at 2653.
71. Id. at 2656.
72. Id. at 2657. Besides Patrick Kennedy, Richard Davis has also been convicted of
the aggravated rape of a five-year-old child and sentenced to death by a Louisiana jury.
Id.

11

1326

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

Having concluded that there was a national consensus against the
use of capital punishment as a penalty for the crime of child rape, the
Court went on to utilize its own independent judgment. It was
recognized that the victim of child rape would suffer from potentially
Despite this
permanent psychological and emotional damage.73
recognition of the far-reaching impact of child rape on its victim, the
Court found that ―there [was] a distinction between intentional firstdegree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against
individual persons, even including child rape, on the other.‖74 This
distinction lies in the fact that murder is irrevocable in its effect.
Likewise, the Court views capital punishment as unique and the most
severe of all punishments for its irrevocability.
Further, the Court took into consideration the number of instances
of reported child rape versus that of first-degree murder.75 The Court
notes that ―approximately 5,702 incidents of vaginal, anal, or oral rape of
a child under the age of 12 were reported nationwide in 2005.‖76 This
number was twice the amount of ―total incidents of intentional murder
for victims of all ages (3,405) reported during the same period.‖77 This
significantly large pool of offenders who would potentially be subject to
capital punishment conflicts with the principle behind many of the
Court‘s decisions that use of the death penalty should be narrowed to
only the most depraved offenders. The Court also expressed concern that
the characteristics of the crime of child rape could potentially overwhelm
a juror‘s judgment, leading to the arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty.78
Looking towards the death penalty‘s possible effect as a deterrent
against future instances of child rape, the Supreme Court weighed into
the balance the fact that child sexual abuse is underreported. ―[O]ne of
the most commonly cited reasons for the nondisclosure [of child rape] is
the fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator . . . .‖ 79 This fear
has increased relevance when the alleged perpetrator is a family member.
In the reasoning of the Court, the fear of the consequences for the
perpetrator is increased when capital punishment is an option. This
increased fear, due to the availability of the death penalty as a potential
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 2658.
Id. at 2660.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2661.
Id. at 2664.
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sanction, would possibly lead to a decrease in disclosure of child rape.
This decrease in disclosure would be counterproductive to any possible
deterrent benefits derived from the utilization of the death penalty. ―In
addition, by effectively making the punishment for child rape and murder
equivalent, a State that punishes child rape by death may remove a strong
incentive for the rapist not to kill the victim.‖80 These concerns,
supported by evidence of a national consensus, led the majority to
conclude that the death penalty as a sanction for child rape where the
victim was not killed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.81
The conclusion drawn by the Court that there existed a national
consensus against the use of the death penalty as a sanction for child rape
was contested by Justice Alito‘s dissent. ―In assessing current norms, the
Court relies primarily on the fact that only 6 of the 50 states now have
statutes that permit the death penalty for this offense. But this statistic is
a highly unreliable indicator of the views of state lawmakers and their
constituents.‖82 As a result of the Court‘s decision in Coker, legislatures
have been stunted in their consideration of the matter. While the holding
in Coker was specific to the unconstitutionality of the death penalty for
the rape of adult women, the dicta and reasoning behind the opinion
suggested that the death penalty would be unconstitutional in all
instances of rape where the victim was not killed. Justice Alito‘s dissent
lists the numerous state court decisions that have misconstrued the Coker
decision.83 In Utah v. Gardner, it was said ―[t]he Coker holding leaves
no room for the conclusion that any rape, even an ‗inhuman‘ one
involving and aggravated battery but not resulting in death, would
constitutionally sustain imposition of the death penalty.‖84 Likewise, in
Merrow v. Georgia, it was determined that while Georgia law continued
to ―prescribe that the death penalty may be imposed for some crimes
(e.g., armed robbery, rape, kidnapping with bodily injury)‖ that
―constitutional decisional law prescribes that the death penalty cannot be
imposed where no death results.‖85

80. Id.
81. Id. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2666 (Alito, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2667 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Utah v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 653
(Utah 1997)).
85. Merrow v. Georgia, 601 S.E.2d 428, 429-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)). In 2008 prior to the decision in Kennedy, the Georgia
Supreme Court recognized that the United States Supreme Court had not yet ―addressed
whether the death penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate for the crime of raping a
child.‖ Georgia v. Velazquez, 657 S.E.2d 838, 840 (Ga. 2008). The statement in
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Even those courts that did not misconstrue the holding in Coker
recognized that Coker raised doubts as to whether statutes that allowed
for the death penalty for non-homicide crimes could be constitutionally
sustained.86 In People v. Hernandez, the California Supreme Court
recognized that the decision in Coker raised ―serious doubts that the
federal Constitution permitted the death penalty for any offense not
requiring the actual taking of human life.‖87 And in People v.
Huddleston, the Illinois Supreme Court also recognized that ―the
constitutionality of state statutes that impose[d] the death penalty for
nonhomicide crimes [was] the subject of debate.‖88 These doubts as to
the constitutionality of capital punishment for non-homicide crimes such
as child rape were further fostered by the Court‘s decision in Eberheart
v. Georgia, where the Court vacated the death penalty for the crime of
aggravated kidnapping, and their decision in Enmund, where the use of
the death penalty as a sanction for those vicariously involved in felony
murder was held unconstitutional.89
For the past three decades, these interpretations [and
doubts] have posed a very high hurdle for state
legislatures considering the passage of new laws
permitting the death penalty for the rape of the child.
The enactment and implementation of any new state
death penalty statute–and particularly a new type of
statute such as one the specifically targets the rape of
young children–imposes many costs. There is the burden
of drafting an innovative law that must take into account
this Court‘s exceedingly complex Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence . . . . And if the law is eventually
overturned, there is the burden of new proceedings on
remand . . . . Accordingly, the Coker dicta gave state
legislators a strong incentive not to push for the
enactment of new capital child-rape laws even though
these legislators and their constituents may have
believed that the laws would be appropriate and
Velazquez, while clarifying the position of the Georgia Supreme Court, does not discount
the argument that many courts have misconstrued the holding in Coker.
86. See People v. Hernandez, 30 Cal. 4th 835, 867 (2003); Leatherwood v. State,
548 So. 2d 389, 406 (Miss. 1989).
87. Hernandez, 30 Cal. 4th at 867.
88. People v. Huddleston, 816 N.E.2d 322, 341 (Ill. 2004).
89. Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977). Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982).
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desirable.90
This suppression of the natural development of legislative
enactments can be seen in the arguments made by the opposition to
proposed capital rape statutes in Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.91
In all three states, opponents argued that the statutes would be wasteful
and doomed, as the Coker dicta suggested that these statutes would be
held unconstitutional.92 Keith Hampton, a spokesperson for the Texas
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association stated that the then-proposed
statute was ―not going to be constitutional.‖93 Likewise, Barbara
Bergman, President of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, argued that Supreme Court decisions limited the death penalty
to instances where a life was taken.94 In 2006, in response to the South
Carolina Senate passing a bill that authorized the death penalty for
defendants convicted twice for the rape of a child under the age of
eleven, it was argued that the law ―violate[d] the Eighth Amendment‘s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.‖95
Legal commentators have also repeatedly expressed the viewpoint
that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Coker could be applied to prohibit
the imposition of the death penalty for all rapists regardless of the age of
the victim. In one law review article attempting to predict the decision of
the Supreme Court in Kennedy, it was stated that
the Court‘s plurality opinion [in Coker] supports one simple
conclusion--the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for rape because the victim does not die. Stated
alternatively, it is unconstitutional to execute the perpetrator
of a crime unless the victim dies. This simple rationale
seems to apply as equally to the rape of a child under the
age of twelve as it does to the rape of an adult woman.96
90. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2667-68 (2008).
91. Id. at 2668.
92. Id.
93. Mike Ward, Victims Groups, Prosecutors See Problems with Dewhurst
Proposal,
STATESMAN,
Jan.
22,
2007,
http://www.statesman.com/search/content/region/legislature/stories/01/23/23jessica.html.
94. Oklahoma Gov. Approves Death Penalty for Repeat Child Molesters, FOX
NEWS, June 9, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,198931,00.html.
95. Colin Garrett, Death Watch: South Carolina Death Penalty for Child Rapists
‘Likely to be Unconstitutional’, 30 CHAMPION 46 (June 2006).
96. David W. Schaaf, What if the Victim is a Child? Examining the
Constitutionality of Louisiana’s Challenge to Coker v. Georgia, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 347,
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In another article that discussed the use of the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes, it was argued that by ―[c]ombining the Coker reasoning
with the logic behind the Enmund decision, the Supreme Court . . .
[would] find that the use of the death penalty for a crime which does not
involve the death of another human being is grossly disproportionate.‖97
This argument was based on the view that ―[t]he plurality in Coker chose
to draw a bright-line rule between homicide and non-homicide crimes
when it came to the application of the death penalty.‖98 And yet another
article claimed that in Coker, ―the Supreme Court ruled that the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes from which no death results
violates the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the eighth
amendment.‖99 And still, another article noted that ―[i]mposing the death
penalty for nonhomicides ha[d] been legally troubling since 1977.‖100 As
the article explained, it had become so troubling because it was in that
year that ―the U.S. Supreme Court held in Coker . . . that the Eighth
Amendment‘s ban on cruel and unusual punishment prevents states from
executing defendants who rape adult woman.‖101
With the natural development of legislative enactments curtailed,
inaction by state legislatures is not necessarily evidence of a societal
view disfavoring capital punishment in child rape cases. In light of the
shadow of Coker, it seems that more weight should be given to the six
states that enacted capital child rape statutes. The actions of those states,
despite the doubts created by Coker about the constitutionality of the
statutes enacted, suggest a deep societal concern about the punishment of
child rapists.
This societal concern coincides with the increase in number of
reported cases of child sexual abuse since the mid-1970s.102 In 1976, the
number of reported cases of sexual abuse was six thousand.103 By 1990,
353-54 (2000).
97. Jeffrey C. Matura, When Will It Stop? The Use of the Death Penalty for Nonhomicide Crimes, 24 J. LEGIS. 249, 262 (1998).
98. Id. at 252.
99. Leigh Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel: Making Sense Out of the Death
Penalty Debate in State Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 873, 878
(1991).
100. Michael Higgins, Is Capital Punishment For Killers Only?, 83 A.B.A. J. 30,
30 (Aug. 1997).
101. Id.
102. Arthur J. Lurigio, Marylousie Jones & Barbara E. Smith, Child Sexual Abuse:
Its Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 FED. PROBATION
69, 69 (Sept. 1995).
103. Id.
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there were an estimated one hundred and forty-six thousand cases of
child sexual abuse.104 In 2003, there were an estimated ninety thousand
cases of child sexual abuse.105 As a result, this concern with the sexual
abuse of children has manifested itself in the enactment of various
statutes that require the registration of convicted sex offenders in all of
the fifty states.106 In addition, many states also have statutes permitting
the involuntary commitment of ―sexual predators‖ or statutes that impose
residency and employment restrictions on individuals who are convicted
sex offenders.107
104. Crimes
Against
Children
Research
Center,
Sexual
Abuse,
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/sexual-abuse/Child%20Sexual%20Abuse.pdf.
105. Id. at 2.
106. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2670. For a list of state statutes, see id. at n.3 (citing
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-200, 13A-11-201(1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 1.56.840, 12.63.010100, 18.65.087, 28.05.048, 33.30.035 (1995 and 1995 Cum. Supp.); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3821 to 3825 (1989 and Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-12-901 to 909
(1995); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290 to 290.4 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18-3-412.5 (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-102a to 54-102r (West Supp. 1995);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4120 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.13, 775.22 (West 1992
and Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.1 (1994); Act of June 14, 1995, 1995 Haw.
Sess. Laws 160; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-340(11)(f), 18-8301 to 18-8311 (Supp. 1995);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 730 §§ 150/1 to 150/10 (West 2002); IND. CODE §§ 5-2-12-1
to 5-2-12- 13 (West Supp. 1995); Act of May 3, 1995, 1995 Iowa Legis. Serv. 146
(West); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4901 to 4910 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 17.500 to
540 (West Supp. 1994); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15:540 to 549 (Supp. 1995); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11001 to 11004 (Supp. 1995); Act of May 9, 1995, 1995 Md.
Laws 142; MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178D ; Act of July 13, 1994, 1994 Mich. Pub.
Acts 295; MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1992 and Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-33-1
to 45-33-19 (Supp. 1995); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 566.600 to 625 (Supp. 1996); MONT.
CODE. ANN. §§ 46-23-501 to 507 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 4001 to 4014; NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 207.080, 207.151 to 157 (1992 and Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632A:11 to A:19 (Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2c: 7-2 to 7-11 (West 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 29-11A-1 to 11A-8 (West Supp. 1995); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168 to 168-V
(McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.5 to208.10 (Supp. 1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 2950.01 to 2950.08
(West 1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, §§ 582 -84 (Supp. 2003); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 181.507519 (1993); Act of Oct. 24, 1995 Pa. Laws 24; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16 (1994); S.C.
CODE. ANN. § 23-3-430; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-30 to 22-22-41 (Supp. 1995);
TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to 40-39-108 (2003); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN art.
6252-13c.1 (Vernon Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-212.5, 77-27-21.5. (Supp.
1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5402; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to 390.1 (1995);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.550, 9A.44.130, 9A.44.140, 10.01.200, 70.48. 470, 72.09.330
(1992 and Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8F-1 to 61-8F-8 (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. §
174.45 (Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-19-301 to 306 (1995)).
107. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2670. There are twenty-one states with statutes
permitting the involuntary commitment of sexual predators. For a list of these twentyone statutes, see id. at n.4 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-3701 to 3713 (2003 and Supp.
1998); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600 to 6609. 3 (West 1998 and Supp. 2008);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a -566 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910 to 931 (West 2002
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This societal concern has grown not only out of the dramatic
increase in the number of reported instances of child rape and sexual
abuse, but also from the growing awareness of the corresponding
physical, psychological and social effects on victims of child rape. The
physical problems that result from child rape have been reported as
―abdominal pain, vomiting, urinary tract infections, perineal bruising and
tearing, pharyngeal infections, and venereal diseases.‖108 There has also
been research to suggest that the trauma sustained by a child during rape
could be one of the ―cause[s] of the early onset cervical cancer.‖ 109
Beyond the physical effects of child rape, a victim of child rape is likely
to suffer from potentially severe psychological problems.
Psychological problems stemming from child rape
include depression, insomnia, sleep disturbances,
nightmares, compulsive masturbation, loss of toilet
training, sudden school failure, and unprovoked crying.
The child who has been raped is also subject to feelings
of guilt, poor self-esteem, feelings of inferiority, selfdestructive behavior, a greater likelihood of becoming a
drug or alcohol addict, and increased suicide attempts.
Furthermore, evidence suggests that these disturbances
follow the child into adulthood.110

and Supp. 2005); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 207/1 to 201/99 (2002); IOWA CODE §§
229A.1 to .16 (Supp. 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2004 and Supp. 2005); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.051; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123A (1989); MINN. STAT. §
253B.02 (1992); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480 to 513 (West 2000 and Supp. 2006); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 83-174 to 83-174.05 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4 -27.24 to 30:4-27.38
(West Supp. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3 (2002); ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.005
(1998); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9791-99 (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to 4448-170 (2002 and Supp. 2007); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001 to
841.147 (Vernon 2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to 920 (2006 and Supp. 2007);
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992 and Supp. 2002); WIS. STAT. § 980.01-13 (2005).
There are at least 11 states that have enacted residency restrictions for sex offenders. See
ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (Supp. 2007); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3003 (West Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405 (7)(a)(2)(2001); GA.
CODE ANN. § 42-1-13 (Supp. 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/11 – 9.3(b-5) (Supp.
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.495 (West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14:91.1 (Supp.
2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031 (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §
590 (West 2003); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 144.642-643 (1999)).
108. Melissa Meister, Murdering Innocence: The Constitutionality of Capital Child
Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 208-09 (2003).
109. Id. at 209.
110. Id.
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Yet due to the language and reasoning of Coker, there is a high level
of likelihood that state legislatures were unnaturally influenced in their
actions in considering capital child rape enactments. Despite this
possibility of a constrained legislature, the majority found there to be
sufficient evidence that there was a national consensus against the
imposition of the death penalty in instances of child rape that did not
result in death of the child. This conclusion was supported by the
Court‘s own independent judgment, leading it to conclude that capital
child rape statutes were unconstitutional as cruel and unusual under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
IV. Impact of Kennedy v. Louisiana
The immediate effect of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Kennedy
v. Louisiana was readily apparent in the invalidation of the capital child
rape statutes, not only in Louisiana, but also in Texas, South Carolina,
Georgia, Montana, and Oklahoma.111 The holding that the death penalty
was unconstitutional as a penalty for child rape also had the effect of
removing that particular sanction from the consideration of other state
legislatures. Before the decision had been reached, there was evidence
that the states of Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri and
Tennessee had been contemplating legislation authorizing the death
penalty for child rape.112
In fact, after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Kennedy,
eighty-five members of Congress sent a letter to the Court asking that its
ruling be reconsidered.113 That letter reflected a concern with the Court‘s
failure to recognize a 2006 amendment that had been passed by Congress
that allowed for the death penalty for the crime of child rape under the
Uniformed Code of Military Justice. The Court was urged to consider
the fact that the provision allowing for the death penalty in child rape
cases passed the House of Representatives by a vote of three hundred and
seventy four to forty-one, and passed in the Senate by a vote of ninetyfive to zero.114 The eighty-five members of Congress urged that this
111. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rejects Death Penalty for Child Rape,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
26,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/washington/26scotuscnd.html?pagewanted=1&_r=.
112. Brief for Texas, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, No. 07-343,
2008 WL 782550, at *10, (U.S. Mar. 19, 2008), for Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct.
2641 (2008).
113. Rep. Cubin Signs Letter Asking Court to Reconsider Child Rape Decision, US
FED. NEWS, July 23, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 13782270.
114. Id.
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voting record showed evidence of a national consensus. The Court
denied the request to rehear the case, maintaining its original holding: the
death penalty as a penalty for child rape is unconstitutional as a violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.115
The decision in Kennedy, however, reached far beyond the instances
of child rape.116 While the Court‘s holding did not address offenses
against the State, such as ―treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug
kingpin activity,‖ the holding is not limited to child rape but is also
applicable to other criminal offenses against an individual where the
victim is not killed.117 The Court held that ―[a]s it relates to crimes
against individuals . . . the death penalty should not be expanded to
instances where the victim‘s life was not taken.‖118 The holding
therefore limits state legislators not just in terms of using the death
penalty for instances of child rape, but also in the use of the death
penalty as a punishment for almost all non-murder crimes. In being so
constrained, state legislators cannot freely advocate for the consensus
and will of their constituents.
State legislators and members of Congress, as elected officials, are
supposed to serve as the voice of their constituents. A holding restricting
state legislators and members of Congress has the ultimate effect of
limiting the voice of the people.
[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the
moral values of the people. The deference we owe to the
decisions of the state legislatures under our federal
system, is enhanced where the specification of
punishment is concerned, for these peculiarly questions
of legislative policy. Caution is necessary lest this Court
become, under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the standards
of criminal responsibility . . . throughout the country. A
decision that a given punishment is impermissible under
the Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a
constitutional amendment. The ability of the people to
express their preference through the normal democratic

115.
116.
117.
118.

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008) (Mem.).
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659.
Id.
Id.
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processes, as well as through ballot referenda, is shut
off.119
Beyond the effect on the ability of state legislatures as the voice of
their constituents to enact statutes allowing for the death penalty in nonmurder crimes, there is also a non-obvious effect on state practices with
respect to capital punishment.
As capital punishment is now
circumscribed to instances of murder and potentially crimes against the
state, the number of offenders exposed to the possible sanction of the
death penalty will be necessarily limited. As the Court in Kennedy
noted, there were ―[a]pproximately 5,702 incidents of vaginal, anal, or
oral rape of a child under the age of 12 were reported nationwide in
2005.‖120 The associated number of offenders connected with those
reported incidents of child rape are now permanently excluded, as a
result of the Court‘s decision in Kennedy, from the pool of individuals
who could have been exposed to the death penalty. And while it cannot
be proven to an absolute certainty, a limited pool of offenders who are
potentially vulnerable to the death penalty will almost certainly result in
a decreased number of offenders who will be sentenced to death in
comparison to the number of individuals that would have been sentenced
with capital punishment had the pool of potential offenders been more
encompassing. As the Court has, in previous cases, looked towards the
actual numbers of individuals sentenced to death as evidence of the
existence or non-existence of a national consensus, this potentially
decreased number, therefore, has the potential of impacting the Supreme
Court‘s determination in future death penalty cases.121 By manipulating
the possible pool of offenders exposed to the death penalty, the Supreme
Court has unnaturally influenced one of the very ―objective factors‖ of
state practice that it has typically relied on in determining whether or not
there is a natural consensus concerning death penalty regulations.
The impact of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Kennedy v.
Louisiana affects not only the actual statutes that it has invalidated; it
also has an impact on future state enactments and future state practice in
regards to execution. These two areas of impact coincide with two of the
main areas that influence the Court in its determination of the existence
119. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
120. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2660. It is noted in Kennedy that this number is twice
that of the total number of incidents of intentional murder for the same time period. Id.
121. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-65 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
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of a national consensus. As a result, under the current scheme of Eighth
Amendment capital jurisprudence, the Kennedy decision will ultimately
have an influence on the objective evidence that is utilized in the
determination of whether there is a national consensus in future death
penalty cases. So while the decision in Kennedy has only been a partial
victory for those that oppose the death penalty,122 it is possible that this
current victory eventually could lead to the ultimate triumph for those
morally opposed to capital punishment: the declaration that the death
penalty itself is cruel and unusual punishment.
Yet, perhaps that outcome is implicit in the very concept of
―evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.‖123 The words ―evolving,‖ ―progress,‖ and ―maturing‖ denote
the idea that society with its evolving standards of decency is moving
towards some ultimate ideal of society. For as the majority in Kennedy
stated in response to the concern that it was, by its own actions,
interfering with the natural development of consensus:
these concerns overlook the full meaning and substance
of the established proposition that the Eighth
Amendment is defined by the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
Confirmed by repeated, consistent rulings of this Court,
this principle requires that use of the death penalty be
restrained. The rule of evolving standards of decency
with specific marks on the way to full progress and
mature judgment means that resort to the penalty must
be reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its
instances of application.124

122. However, even those that morally oppose the death penalty have criticized the
Kennedy decision for its reasoning.
123. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2664 (quotation omitted).
124. Id. at 2664-65 (internal punctuation and citation omitted).
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